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IN THE  SECOND  QUARTER  of  1974, real gross national product stood 2.2 
percent below its peak rate of the fourth quarter of 1973, reflecting one of 
the sharpest  two-quarter  declines in the postwar period. Yet, between these 
two quarters,  the unemployment rate rose only 0.4 percentage point, from 
4.7 to 5.1 percent, an unusually small rise against the background of his- 
torical experience and analytical expectations. In the third quarter, the 
rate moved up further,  to 5.5 percent; but it stili displayed puzzling sluggish- 
ness since, according to preliminary  estimates, real GNP fell further in that 
quarter.  This paper will focus on the behavior of unemployment in relation 
to output between 1973:4 and 1974:2. 
The Record of Changes 
In Table 1, movements of output and unemployment from  1973:4 to 
1974:2 are compared with those in the first two quarters after the peak of 
the four post-Korean recessions.' By coincidence, the increase in the unem- 
ployment  rate during three of  the  four  previous two-quarter intervals 
1. This comparison  is relevant  in my judgment  whether  or not 1973-74 is ultimately 
classified  as another  recession  by the official  scorekeepers  at the National Bureau  of Eco- 
nomic Research. 
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Table  1. Comparison  of Changes  in Unemployment  Rates  and  Output, 
1973:4-1974:2  and  Post-Korean  Recessions 
Change  in 
unemployment  rate 
(percentage  poinits)  Change  in real GNP 
Gapa 
Actual  Estimated  Actual  (percentage 
(A U)  (A U*)  (percent)  points) 
Period  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
1973:4-1974:2  0.4  1.5  -2.20  4.36 
1953:2-1953:4  1.1  1.2  -1.83  3.56 
1957:3-1958:1  2.1  2.0  -3.89  6.07 
1960:2-1960:4  1.1  1.1  -1.23  3.17 
1969:4-1970:2  1.1  0.8  -0.41  2.46 
Sources: Actual unemployment rates-official  data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics; real GNP 
and gap-Business  Conditions  Digest (April 1974), p. 109, and (August 1974), p. 95; AU* is calculated as 
one-third of the change in the gap. 
a.  The change in the difference  between potential and actual GNP, expressed  as a percent of actual GNP. 
amounted  to 1.1 percentage  points; for the particularly  severe 1957-58 
recession,  the increment  was 2.1. Thus, although  the drop in real GNP 
during  the first  two quarters  of 1974  exceeded  that in three  of the four  pre- 
vious instances,  as column  (3) shows, the rise in the unemployment  rate 
was much  smaller. 
The same result  emerges  when the actual  movement  of the unemploy- 
ment  rate  is compared  with the "estimated"  change  consistent  with a rule 
of thumb  that  I set forth  in 1961.  According  to this rule,  the change  in the 
unemployment  rate  (measured  in points)  between  any two periods  should 
approximate  one-third  of the change  in the percentage  gap  between  poten- 
tial and actual  GNP.2  The change  in the gap expressed  as a percentage  of 
actual  GNP is shown  in column  (4) of Table  1. One-third  of that change  is 
then  the crude  predicted  change  in the unemployment  rate,  AU*,  recorded 
in column  (2). That  estimate  agrees  remarkably  well  with  the actual  change 
in the unemployment  rate, AU, in the four previous  instances,  but is far 
from  the mark  in the most recent  period. 
2. See "Potential  GNP: Its Measurement  and Significance,"  reprinted  in The Politi- 
cal Economy  of Prosperity  (Brookings  Institution, 1970), Appendix, pp. 132-45. Also 
see my "Upward  Mobility  in a High-pressure  Economy,"  Brookings  Papers  on Economic 
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AN  EXAMINATION  OF  THE PIECES 
Given the path of output, changes  in unemployment  depend on the 
movements  of (1) the  labor  force,  (2) average  weekly  hours,  and  (3) produc- 
tivity.  When  the behavior  of these  three  factors  is examined,  the unusually 
small  increase  in unemployment  during  the first  two quarters  of 1974  can  be 
clearly attributed  to  an especially  sharp decline in productivity.  The 
movements  of the labor force and average  weekly  hours  were  reasonably 
consistent  with previous  experience.  That of output per manhour  was 
unprecedented. 
Labor  force. The labor  force expanded  by 0.74 percent  from 1973:4  to 
1974:2,  a marked  slowing  from  its growth  of 1.54  percent  from 1973:2  to 
1973:4  (see Table  2). The slowdown  of 0.8 percent  is larger  than that in 
three  of the four preceding  periods  of declining  output,  although  smaller 
than  the 1.0 percent  swing  in the second  half of 1953. 
The slowdown  of growth  in the labor force during  1974  was especially 
pronounced  viewed  against  the rapid growth  during  the second half of 
1973;  the annual  rate of 3.1 percent  in that period far exceeded  trend 
growth.  Viewed  against  normal  trend  growth  the  exact  size  of the slowdown 
is hard  to estimate,  because  the trend  growth  rate  is uncertain.  At the start 
of the decade,  Labor  Department  projections  put the trend  growth  of the 
total  labor  force  from 1970  to 1975  at 1.54  percent  per  year.  In retrospect, 
that  was  clearly  too low. In the second  quarter  of 1974,  in fact, the size of 
the total labor  force  already  exceeded  the projection  for 1975.  From 1970 
to mid-1974,  the growth  of the total labor force has averaged  about 2.0 
percent  a year.3  If par  for the course  is 2 percent  a year,  or 1.0 percent  in 
two quarters,  the actual  growth  experienced  during  the first  two quarters 
of 1974  represented  a shortfall  of only  0.26 percent  of the total labor force, 
or about 250,000  persons.  If the recent  behavior  of the labor force is at 
all mysterious,  the puzzle  is why it is holding  up so well in the face of a 
weakening  economy  rather  than why it has slowed. The unemployment 
3. Sophia C. Travis,  "The U.S. Labor Force: Projections  to 1985,"  Bureau  of Labor 
Statistics,  Special  Labor Force Report 119 (1970; processed),  p. 4. More generally,  the 
evident  imbalance  between  the availability  of capital  and the availability  of labor  in 1973 
may have reflected  the extraordinary  growth of the labor force as well as the relatively 
slow growth  of capital  stock in manufacturing.  The big surprise  of recent  years  has been 
the spurt  in teenage  participation  rates, which kept the Perry  shift in motion long after 
it was scheduled  to stabilize  on demographic  grounds. c~~~~~~~ 
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rate rose so little, not because the labor force behaved weakly, but because 
total  employment performed relatively strongly.  Employment rose,  al- 
though very slowly, from 1973:4 to  1974:2, in contrast to its declines in 
the previous downturns shown in Table 2.4 
Average weekly hours. Average weekly hours for all persons in the total 
private economy declined from 37.7 hours in  1973:4  to  37.4  hours  in 
1974:2, or by 0.8 percent.5  The shortening of hours was widely diffused; 
it extended to most industrial sectors and most manufacturing industries. 
As indicated  in Table 2, the drop in hours is a little smaller than the average 
in the four previous periods; nonetheless, it is a bit larger than the estimate 
of 0.6 percent associated with a 4.36 percent swing in the gap according to 
the average relationships underlying the three-to-one rule of  thumb.6 By 
any standard, the behavior of average hours stayed reasonably on track, 
and does not account for the sluggish movement of unemployment. 
Output  per manhour. Among the components determining the impact of 
weak output on unemployment, productivity presented the  one startling 
performance. Output per manhour for the total  private economy  fell 1.7 
percent during the first two quarters of 1974, reflecting a 2.5 percent drop 
in real private GNP  and a reduction of only 0.8 percent in private man- 
hours. The decline of 1.7 percent essentially reverses the sign of the increase 
that would be expected on a normal trend path over a two-quarter interval. 
During the previous four periods recorded in  Table 2, productivity ex- 
perienced slow growth or a tiny dip, but no drop like that of the first two 
quarters of 1974. Indeed, no precedent for this nose dive in  productivity 
can be  found  in  any two-quarter interval of  the  past  generation. The 
relationships underlying the three-to-one rule of  thumb imply that about 
one-third of the widening of the gap should be reflected in a slowdown of 
productivity  relative  to trend. That would have pointed essentially to a tiny 
4. In previous downturns,  employment as measured from employers' reports has 
typically  fallen  more  sharply  than it has according  to the figures  derived  from household 
data.  But that was not true  during  the first  two quarters  of 1974.  Although  the household 
data had shown surprising  strength  relative  to the establishment  data during  the brisk 
part of the expansion,  the establishment  data actually  performed  a little more strongly 
in the first half of 1974. 
5. Based  on unpublished  data  of the Bureau  of Labor  Statistics.  The published  indexes 
(1967=100) record a decline  from 97.4 to 96.8, which is slightly smaller, presumably 
reflecting  differences  in rounding.  Also, if average  hours  in government  (which presum- 
ably are unaffected  by cyclical conditions) were included, the economy-wide  decline 
would be a bit smaller. 
6. Okun, "Upward  Mobility,"  p. 211. 500  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1974 
Table  3. Difference  between  Actual  and  Estimated  Unemployment  Rates, 
1973:4-1974:2  and  Post-Korean  Recessions 
Percentage  points; seasonally  adjusted 
Peak  Two  quarters  Six quarters 
quarter  after  peak  after  peak 
Period  (1)  (2)  (3) 
1973:4-1974:2  0  -1.1  ? 
1953:2-1953:4  -0.7  -0.8  0.3 
1957:3-1958:1  -1.0  -0.9  -0.2 
1960:2-1960:4  -0.8  -0.7  0 
1969:4-1970:2  -1.0  -0.7  0 
Source: Same as Table 1. Estimated rates are calculated as 4.0 plus one-third of the gap. 
increase in productivity during these two quarters, given the normal trend 
growth of 1.5 percent in two quarters  and the widening of the gap of about 
4.4 percent. 
The  Record  of Levels 
The estimates discussed so far use the rule of thumb on an incremental 
basis to estimate  the change  in unemployment from the change  in the output 
gap. Quite a different picture of accuracy emerges when the level of the 
unemployment rate is calculated as 4 percent plus one-third of the percent- 
age gap. In previous instances, that estimate has erred by a considerable 
margin for particular  quarters, as Figure 1 reveals. Indeed, 1974:2 has five 
previous companions with errors of  1 percentage point or a little more.7 
The errors have a distinct cyclical pattern. As column (1) of Table 3 indi- 
cates, the estimated unemployment rate significantly exceeded the actual 
rate in the peak quarters  preceding  each of the four post-Korean recessions. 
And in tracking the change in the unemployment rate during the next two 
quarters, the estimated rate remained substantially above the actual rate, 
as is evident in the shaded periods of Figure 1. The overpredictions in the 
four previous instances ranged between 0.7 and 0.9 percentage point, quite 
similar to the 1.1 point error of 1974:2 reported in column (2) of Table 3. 
On this way of looking at it, the main irregularity of 1973-74 is that the 
7. In using  a growth  rate  of 4.0 percent  for potential  GNP in recent  years,  I am follow- 
ing (blindly)  the  judgment  of the Council  of Economic  Advisers,  as reported  in Business 
Conditionis  Digest.  See, for example,  the August  1974 issue, p. 95. . ....  . . . . . . . . . . 
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rule of thumb was working in the peak quarter;  it was, unusually, right on 
the button in 1973:4. Then it behaved more typically in not working during 
the decline and hence overestimating  unemployment during the first half of 
1974. 
The typical lead of the rule-of-thumb  estimate over the actual unemploy- 
ment rate is evident in Figure  1. During periods when output is rising 
particularly  rapidly and thus the gap is shrinking a lot, productivity moves 
up very sharply and average weekly hours are especially expanded; these 
responses tend to  dampen the decline in  unemployment, and keep the 
actual rate (U) above the estimates of the rule of thumb (U*). Periods in 
1955, 1965-66, and 1972-73 exemplify this pattern in Figure 1. But when 
output slows down, employment keeps expanding strongly. This is typically 
reflected  in a major slowdown in productivity  (and sometimes a pronounced 
cut in average weekly hours), which produces the tendency for the rule of 
thumb to overestimate the unemployment rate in the late stages of expan- 
sion.  Periods of pronounced slowdown took  place prior to  the peak in 
actual real GNP in 1957, 1960, and 1969, resulting  in U* substantially  above 
U at the cyclical peaks. In fact, a slowdown did get started after 1973: 1 
and, during it, U* caught up with U. But the slowdown was neither pro- 
longed nor pronounced before real GNP turned down. 
As the momentum of increasing demand for labor vanishes during the 
later stages of recession and as labor demand rebounds only gradually in 
the initial quarters of recovery, the rule of thumb comes back on track. 
Six quarters  after each cyclical peak in the previous periods, it was working 
remarkably  well, as column (3) of Table 3 demonstrates. 
A Suggested Explanation 
The fact that the level of the actual unemployment rate in mid-1974 was 
substantially  below that estimated by the rule of thumb is entirely  consistent 
with the previous performance of that rule in periods of declining output. 
The  unusual behavior of  the  change in  unemployment, relative to  the 
rule-of-thumb estimate, arises because the rule of thumb was correct in 
1973:4 whereas it had overestimated at previous peaks. In my judgment, 
that difference emerged because the  1971-73 expansion never developed 
the  symptoms of  senility usual in the late stages of  expansions, simply 
because the period of increasing real GNP was interrupted  by the Arab oil Arthur  M. Okun  503 
embargo. If 1974 had followed the scenario (widely predicted prior to the 
embargo) of  sluggish but continuing growth in output,  U* would have 
risen; but employment demand would have reflected  the momentum that it 
had gathered during the 1973 upswing, and U would not have increased 
much. Hence,  U* would have exceeded U in the pattern typical of late 
expansions. The suddenness of the downturn in real GNP accentuated the 
rise in U* relative to that of U. In particular, the business community may 
have continued strongly expansive personnel policies because of the initial 
expectation  that  early  1974 represented merely  a  temporary, energy- 
induced, dip in activity. Operating under that belief, businessmen adapted 
to  1973 demands, hiring more workers and preparing to  use  them effi- 
ciently after a brief energy crisis. They did cut the workweek in response to 
existing conditions. Because corporate profits (at least those of companies 
that use first-in-first-out accounting practices) kept rising, businessmen 
felt no great pressure  to retrench personnel. 
I can conceive of two other explanatory factors: the impact of the energy 
shortage on productivity, and the possible overdeflation of  real GNP  in 
the national accounts. But I believe that the principal explanation lies in 
the momentum and overoptimism of personnel policies. 
SUPPLY  SHORTAGES 
The shortage of energy and other items probably has reduced the pro- 
ductive potential of the economy and hence productivity, but not by nearly 
enough to unravel the mystery, in my judgment. When trucks drive at 55 
rather than 70 miles per hour, labor is essentially serving as a substitute 
for  energy, and productivity is  depressed. But the reduction in  energy 
consumption cannot begin to explain a productivity shortfall amounting 
to at least $15 billion. Suppose petroleum consumption per unit of business 
output is down as much as 10 percent from the pre-crisis  norm. If as much 
as half of total U.S. petroleum use is intermediate business product, that 
sacrifice would amount to 300 million barrels (annual rates). Each barrel 
not consumed by business would presumably  be worth an amount between 
the 1973 price of $4 and the current "new" oil and import price of roughly 
$10. Assuming that every sacrificed barrel imposed a cost of  $10 in the 
form  of  extra use of  labor, the productivity dent could  not  exceed  $3 
billion. Nor, I suspect, would throwing chemicals, paper, and metals into 
the shortage hopper help much. Of course, to the extent that assembly lines 504  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1974 
can be held up for want of a nail or an oil can, all sorts of terrible things 
can happen to productivity. But it takes a tremendous intellectual strain 
to provide a plausible explanation for the productivity gap that relies on 
shortages. 
OVERDEFLATION 
Still another explanation might argue simply that, in the recent period of 
rapidly rising prices, the increase in the GNP deflator has been overstated 
by the Department of Commerce, and thus real output has been under- 
stated. To be sure, the national accounts were not designed to be precise 
under  any circumstances,  and certainly not under the confusions of double- 
digit inflation. It is not incredible that the annual rate of the deflator for 
the first two quarters of 1974 might be off by a couple of points. But the 
deflator could be too  low as well as too  high. The only evidence (other 
than the productivity mystery itself) that I know suggesting the latter error 
is that the Federal Reserve index of industrial production has been running 
strong in relation to real GNP.  Based on my experience with the relation 
of GNP and the index of industrial production, I believe that only a drown- 
ing economist should grasp for that straw! 
THE  PROSPECT 
Since mid-1974, the energy-dip thesis has lost  favor among economic 
forecasters;  now the prevailing view envisions flat or falling real GNP and 
weaknesses of aggregate demand for a more prolonged period, extending 
through the rest of 1974 and into the first half of 1975. As that view spreads 
to business executives, a much more pronounced retrenchment of employ- 
ment (and some rebound of productivity) should be expected in the months 
ahead, including a catch-up for the past delay-if  my suggested explanation 
is the correct one. In that event, the three-to-one rule of thumb should be 
close to track by 1975:2, as it has been six quarters after previous peaks. 
If real GNP in 1975:2 matches that of  1974:2, the rule of thumb would 
estimate an unemployment rate of 7.6 percent. Subjectively, that looks a 
little high to me; I would make some allowance for the energy shortage 
and incomplete catch-up. But,  given that  path  of  output, I  expect the 
unemployment rate to reach 7 percent in 1975:2. 